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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

5231(b); an effort has been made to afford a judgment debtor notice of
his New York obligation even though he resides and is employed
without the state.
The Survey sets forth in each installment those cases which are
deemed to make the most significant contribution to New York's procedural law. Due to limitations of space, however, many other less important, but, nevertheless, significant cases cannot be included. While
few cases are exhaustively discussed, it is hoped that the Survey accomplishes its basic purpose, viz., to key the practitioner to significant developments in the procedural law of New York.
The Table of Contents is designed to direct the reader to those
specific areas of procedural law which may be of importance to him.
The various sections of the CPLR which are specifically treated in the
cases are listed under their respective titles.
ARTICLE
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LIfITATIONS OF Timr

CPLR 203(a): Cause of action for breach of contract accrues when
plaintiff is harmed and not when the breach occurs.
CPLR 203(a) declares that a statute of limitations begins to run
from the time a cause of action accrues, and a cause of action for breach
of contract generally accrues at the moment the contract is breached.1
Situations arise, however, when the cause of action does not accrue
simultaneously with the breach; and in such cases the court must determine when the six year statute of limitations2 began to run. Lewis v.
Lewis,3 a recent civil court case, provides an excellent illustration of
this type of situation.
The plaintiff, decedent's ex-wife, and decedent had entered into a
separation agreement in 1952 providing, inter alia, that decedent should
maintain an existing life insurance policy, in which plaintiff was named
as the sole beneficiary, so long as plaintiff did not remarry. Plaintiff and
decedent were subsequently divorced. But, in 1956, without plaintiff's
knowledge, decedent cancelled the policy in violation of the agreement.
Knowledge of this breach first came to plaintiff in 1968, shortly after
the decedent's death, at which time she commenced an action to recover
damages in an amount equivalent to the proceeds she would have
received under the policy. The defendant, executrix of decedent's
estate, contended that the statute of limitations barred the action since
it had began to run in 1956 when the policy was cancelled.

1 See

1 WEINSTEN, KORN 8-- MILLER, NEW YORK CrVIL PRACUCE
203.01 (1968).
2 CPLR 213.
3 59 Misc. 2d 525, 299 N.YS.2d 755 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1969).
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The time a cause of action accrues has been defined as the time at
which a plaintiff is first able to maintain the action.4 The Lewis court
was quick to perceive that plaintiff could not have maintained the
action during the decedent's life, since she was entitled to receive the
proceeds from the policy only upon his death. An action sought to be
maintained upon the cancellation of the policy in 1956 would have
been premature since plaintiff had not then been injured by the breach,
and decedent could have made other arrangements before his death to
ensure that plaintiff received the amount of money that would have
been due under the policy. The plaintiff's action, although instituted
twelve years after the breach, was therefore timely. 5
CPLR 203(b)(4): Delivery of summons to foreign sheriff does not extend statute of limitations.
The statute of limitations governing any claim may be extended
sixty days if the summons is delivered to a proper sheriff pursuant to
CPLR 203(b)(4) before the expiration of the designated period.6 When
the defendant is a corporation, the "proper sheriff" is one in a county
in which the corporation may be served. It is readily apparent that
failure to comply with the statute may be a grievous error when the
limitation period has nearly expired.
In Butler v. UBS Chemical Co.,7 the plaintiff attempted to avail
himself of this sixty-day extension. However, the defendant was a
foreign corporation which, while transacting business in New York,
had its offices in Newark, New Jersey; and plaintiff had delivered the
summons to a New Jersey sheriff. The Appellate Division, First Department, reversing the order of the trial court, declared that delivery to a
foreign sheriff does not invoke the extension; service upon the defendant had therefore been effected without the three year period
governing personal injury actions, 8 and the cause of action was barred.
4

Cary v. Koerner, 200 N.Y. 253, 93 N.E. 979 (1910).
5 It is clear that the court was not employing a "discovery of the breach" theory
since the statute of limitations began to run upon decedent's death. Plaintiff's knowledge
of the breach was immaterial in this regard. Cf. CPLR 206(c); CPLR 213(5) & (7);
CPLR 214(7).
6 Delivery to a "proper sheriff" beyond the expiration of the controlling statute is, of
course, ineffective. Manse Builders Inc. v. Northrup, 186 Misc. 889, 60 N.Y.S.2d 80 (Sup.
Ct. Monroe County 1946). And delivery to the wrong sheriff is also ineffective. Guilford
v. Brody, 287 App. Div. 726, 262 N.Y.S. 722 (1st Dep't 1933). However, the proper sheriff
need not serve the summons himself; any person qualified to serve the summons under
the CPLR may do so. Cohoes Bronze Co. v. Georgia Home Ins. Co., 243 App. Div. 224, 276
N.Y.S. 619 (3d Dep't 1935).
7 82 App. Div. 2d 8, 299 N.Y.S.2d 247 (lst Dep't 1969).
8 CPLR 214.

